[redacted]

us, accordingly, it would seem that it would have been much safer to have brought the bulk of Patterson's army to Washington, as soon as the forward movement was entered upon, than to have relied for the success of McDowell's unassisted column upon Patterson's carrying out any general instructions to detain Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley. This last, however, was the course taken by General Scott.

It is not worth while for us to recount in any detail the vexatious story of the experience of General Patterson in his well-meant efforts to fulfil the expectations of his chief* Although not nil educated soldier, Patterson was a veteran of the war with England in 1812 and of the Mexican war, and he undoubtedly knew something about the management of troops in the field. But he was nearly seventy years of age ; he was burdened by his responsibilities. His force at first was, of course, small, and Iris needs were supplied only by degrees. At one time, towards the end of June, when he wns congratulating himself that he was now ready at last to take the offensive in good earnest, he was ordered to semi Iris best troops and. batteries to Washington. He was a victim of the usual tendency to exaggerate

his antagonist's strength ; and, towards the end of the campaign, his intention of boldly going forward and attacking the hostile array faded gradually away before the picture which his apprehensions conjured up of the bloody repulse of his brave volunteers in an unsuccessful attempt to storm the formidable entrenchments of Winchester. General Scott's orders to him,,